As we have seen, after the battle of Angamos, the naval might of Peru came to an end and the Chilean fleet took control of the sea. This new scenario allowed Chile to begin the first phase of the terrestrial campaign of the War of the Pacific, whose immediate objective was to seize the Peruvian region of Tarapaca, rich in minerals and nitrate deposits.
In strategic terms and material resources, the Chilean expeditionary army proved to be superior to the allied forces. On November 2, 1879, despite a strong resistance, 10,000 Chilean soldiers supported by six warships and ten steamers, disembarked at the port of Pisagua establishing their first position in Peruvian territory. During the next days the Chilean Army moved inland and proceeded slowly towards the North. A line of provisions was assured with the valuable support of their fleet. During this process several battles and engagements were fought, all of which were favorable to the Chileans. On November 23 the invaders seized the strategic port of Iquique and in few weeks increased their number to 20,000 troops.
The decimated Peruvian forces, under orders of General Juan Buendia, retreated towards Tarapaca. The High Command of the Chilean army, informed about the difficult situation of the enemy, sent an expedition of 3,900 men with the objective of destroying it. A battle erupted on November 27th. This time it was a Peruvian victory. Chileans lost 687 men between dead and wounded. Peruvians also captured all their guns. The lack of cavalry, provisions and other resources prevented the Peruvian army destroying the remainders of that Chilean force and consolidating their victory.
Tarapaca did not change the strategic results of the invasion and the Peruvians, because of a series of circumstances, were forced to undertake a new retreat towards Arica, a prosperous city of 3,000 inhabitants. The difficult march over hot and arid deserts lasted twenty days, but finally, on December 18th, 1879, they arrived at their destination. General Buendia for mistakes made during the campaign was stripped of his command and Rear Admiral Lizardo Montero took control of all the Peruvian forces in the South.
After those events, the Chilean army undertook the next phase of the war, to be known as the Tacna Campaign. It would develop within a vast scenario that embraced the limits of the rivers Ilo and Moquegua to the North and the rivers Azapa and Sulfuro to the South. The plan included the seizure of all the mayor ports, including Ilo, Pacocha, Islay and Arica as well as the important department of Tacna.
The Peruvian army on the other hand remained nearly four months in Arica, until the first days of April 1880, when Rear Admiral Montero decided to move his troops further to the North to unite with Bolivian forces in Tacna, the new war scenario.
To protect Arica, Rear Admiral Montero left a small garrison of 1,650 national guards and army regulars under command of a naval officer, Captain Camilo Carrillo, who immediately had to resign his commission due to a serious illness. The command fell then in an old retired military officer whose name, in those moments, didn't say much: Francisco Bolognesi, 64 year-old artillery Colonel. Bolognesi, the son of an Italian immigrant, was an old fashion and very patriotic officer addicted to the ordinance. His marked eye-rings, gray hair and white beard, become the frame of a tired but enthusiast man, with a great combative spirit, who had participated courageously in the battles of San Francisco and Tarapaca.
After assuming command, Bolgnesi decided to intensify the defensive works of the port, because in spite of its strategic importance, it was not prepared to face a land assault. Arica never became the unassailable fortress that the Chilean historians have presented, but it was neither a dismantled position as some Peruvian historians argue. Definitely it was not a solid military position, but thanks to the works carried out by Bolognesi it had some important devices. By sea, the position was impenetrable and now it was adapted to contain an eventual infantry assault, always keeping in mind the difficult conditions of the land and the great extension of the areas to defend.
The city was protected to the East and the North through several forts and a total of 19 French-made guns plus the 2 XV-inch Dahlgrens from the ironclad Manco Capac. It had on its flanks a 200-meter high mountain, known as El Morro, which faced the ocean. In the summit of the Morro, a natural plaza of 10,000 square meters, the Peruvians had built fragile barracks and placed nine of their guns to contest the advance of the Chilean squadron. These were known as the “Morro Batteries”, divided into “Upper Batteries” and “Low Batteries”. The upper position had one 250-mm Vavasseur gun, two 100-mm Parrot guns and two 70-mm Voruz guns. The lower part had four 70-mm Voruz.
The command of the batteries at the Morro was placed in charge of the former Captain of the ill-fated ironclad Independence. After the loss of his ship at Punta Gruesa, Juan Guillermo Moore was arrested, striped of his command and court-martialed. Eventually, Moore was cleared of all charges, but the loss of the ship that the nation conferred upon him turned the Captain into a depressive man, who almost committed suicide. Despite the fact that he was cleared and kept his naval rank, Moore´s carrier in the Navy was over. The tormented officer, who once said to a friend that he should pay with his life for having lost his ship, requested to be posted in a high-risk position to save his honor and pay the debt with his country.
The son of Sir John Moore, a member of the Scottish nobility and the Peruvian lady Dolores Ruiz, Juan Guillermo was born in Lima in 1836 and was sent to England to complete his education when he was only 9 years old. At seventeen, he joined the Royal Navy as a cadet. Few years later, in 1854, Peruvian Commander Jose Maria Salcedo, who was supervising the construction in British Shipyards of the war steamers Apurimac, Loa and Tumbes, became acquainted with the young officer and offered him the chance to come home and join the Peruvian Navy. Moore did not think it twice and after a few months he was in his own country, starting a brilliant naval career, which was destroyed after Punta Gruesa.
The crew of the Independence, about 240 men, was also in Arica. They arrived with their Commander aboard the Union on March 17, 1880, and worked with great enthusiasm. Navy Captain Manuel I. Espinoza was commissioned as Chief of Staff of the Morro batteries. Captain Adolfo King received direct command of the lower batteries and Captain Cleto Martinez of the upper ones.
The monitor Manco Capac, anchored at port, was under command of Captain Jose Sanchez Lagomarsino while the torpedo boat Alianza, was under Lieutenant Luis Davila.
On May 26, after the battle of the “Alto de la Alianza” in Tacna, which was fought between 11,000 allies and 20,000 Chileans, the Peruvian regular army ceased to exist as an operative force and the demoralized Bolivian troops retired forever toward the highlands. Arica became isolated and surrounded by land and sea and the Chilean high command decided to capture this last Peruvian position in the South. To do this, an army of 6,500 men, composed of four regiments of infantry (Third, Fourth, Bulnes and Lautaro), four battalions of cavalry, one corps of engineers and 21 Krupp guns, was sent to capture the port.
On the fifth of June, Chilean Sargent Mayor Juan de la Cruz Salvo was sent to the Peruvian headquarters to request their surrender. The gallant Colonel Bolognesi, after a war council, replied to him that he had sacred duties to fulfill; that he was not going to leave his position and that the garrison was going to fight until the last cartridge has been fired. Among the officers who most strongly advocated for the resistance was Commander Moore. That same day, Chilean artillery opened fire against Arica, but caused minor effects. On June 6, 1880, the Chilean fleet, which included the battleship Cochrane, in a simultaneous operation with the land batteries, shelled Arica. During this action the Manco Capac guns performed brilliantly. One of her grenades hit the Cochrane, killing 27 of her crew and forcing her out of combat. Another of her projectiles hit the floating line of the schooner Covadonga, also forcing her to withdraw.
The next day, on June 7, Arica was attacked at dawn by 6,000 Chilean troops. After a fierce and bloody battle, the eastern forts, defended by 800 men collapsed. At the same time, the Northern forts of San Jose, Santa Rosa and Dos de Mayo were attacked by two cavalry battalions and one infantry regiment and finally were captured. The Peruvians were able to destroy most of their guns to avoid their use by the enemy.
The Chilean army next move was to the heights of the Morro, were the survivors, including the crew of the Independence, prepared to give the final stand. The last defenses collapsed to the infernal attack in a Peruvian version of The Alamo. At the sector of the lower batteries, the Peruvian infantry and the crew of the Independence tried to contain the assault, but it was useless. A new fold concentrated to move against the last defenders on the plateau of the Morro. There, virtually without trenches neither havens, and in open field, about 500 Peruvian survivors faced thousands of Chilean soldiers. It was a fierce encounter, fought with bayonets, swords, rifles and pistols. No quarrel was given nor asked.
During the zenith of the combat Colonel Bolognesi and his officers encouraged the men not to faint, until, literally, they fired the last cartridge. The old Bolognesi was hit by a bullet in the chest and was finished off with the breech of a rifle to his head. Captain Moore also fall dead rejecting calls to surrender and redeeming this way the loss of his beloved Independence.
When the combat ceased, about 1,000 Peruvian soldiers had lost their lives. Among the dead were most of the naval officers and men of the Independence.
At 9:00 AM, after watching the Chilean flag being raised at the top of the hill that dominated Arica, Captain Sanchez Lagomarsino ordered the monitor Manco Capac to be scuttled in order to avoid her capture by the Chileans. The faster torpedo boat Alianza meanwhile managed to escape by breaking the blockade of the Chilean warships.
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